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Whilst the D’Hondt system of allocating seats in the European 
Parliament on a regional basis is in an important sense ‘more 
democratic’ than the first-past-the-post system at Westminster, it 
remains biased against smaller parties.  The regional allocation is the 
primary cause of this as there is a high effective threshold for 
representation in smaller districts. 
In the North East of England with 3 MEPs, for example, the effective 
threshold for representation is over 15%.  In the East Midlands (5 
MEPs), it is around 12%, whilst here in the West Midlands (7 MEPs) it 
is about 10%[1].  Why does this matter?  Regions of England that are 
more pro-Brexit (West Midlands, East Midlands, North East) tend to 
be smaller and have fewer MEPs whilst regions that are less pro-
Brexit (London and the South East[2] in particular) tend to be larger. 
This is important because, whilst the Brexit Party looks set to win a 
majority of the Brexit vote, Remainers are split between several 
different parties (Liberal Democrats, Greens and Change 
UK).  Moreover, most Labour voters lean Remain.  Thus, it is 
conceivable that, although over 40% of people in the North East 
supported Remain in the 2016 referendum, the region will return zero 
pro-Remain MEPs because no individual pro-Remain party will get 
above 15% of the vote[3]. 
In contrast, in the Remain bastion of London, each pro-Brexit party 
only needs to receive around 9% of the vote in order to win a seat (a 
hurdle that both the Brexit Party and the Conservatives look set to 
clear).  It is conceivable that pro-Brexit parties could win 3 seats (out 
of 8) in London. 
This means that whilst pro-Remain parties look set to win a significant 
share of total votes cast, they will (collectively) win far fewer seats 
than the Brexit Party.  Moreover, for Remainers seeking to organise to 
maximise the number of Remain-supporting MEPs it is unclear what 
the optimum strategy is given uncertainty over how other Remainers 
will vote[4].  This is particularly so given that substantial numbers of 
Remain voters will support the Labour Party (either through habit or 
because of its policies on other issues). 
Such ruminations have led some to suggest avoiding tactical voting in 
its entirety[5].  Although that recommendation is probably a bit strong it 
does point to the complexities facing the pro-Remain political 
landscape.  It also suggests a potential disconnect between how 
strongly each group feels about Brexit. 
Where many Brexiters feel sufficiently strongly to vote for a single-
issue party with no manifesto or policies, Remainer sentiment appears 
more nuanced.  Some feel unable to support the Liberal Democrats 
(the largest pro-Remain party in most English regions) due to their 
cohabitation with the Conservative Party during the coalition years. 
Others feel that, whilst Brexit is important, they wish to support a party 
that shares their environmental views.  For many Labour voters, the 
party’s ambiguity on Brexit is a potential turnoff.  However, they feel 
that a focus on social justice is even more important.  Perhaps we 
shouldn’t be surprised by this.  Whereas the campaign to leave the 
EU focussed heavily on a handful of extremely emotive themes, the 
campaign to remain part of it focussed on the practical benefits of the 
Union. 
The optics of this election are also important.  Even in the event that 
pro-Remain parties win a significant number of seats, because those 
seats are widely spread amongst parties the Brexit Party will appear 
to have a great many more seats than any individual pro-Remain 
party.  Moreover, whilst Brexit is a particularly important theme for all 
parties at this election, none of the three largest pro-Remain parties 
can truly be labelled ‘single issue’.  The result is that it becomes 
easier to suggest that other factors were at play. 
We saw elements of this in the local elections: it is almost impossible 
to disentangle the impact of Brexit from the myriad of other factors 
that led to a surge in support for the Liberal Democrats (and, to a 
lesser extent, the Green Party).  Was it local issues, was it Brexit or 
was it simply reverting to type?  We do not know. 
Finally, note that the simple dichotomy presented during a referendum 
translates poorly to actual policymaking.  The public essentially voted 
to suggest that they were unhappy with the present relationship with 
the EU.  However, no realistic discussion took place regarding what 
might replace it.  Even today, there remains a disconnect between 
what is feasible and what is desired from Brexit.  The reality is that 
almost everybody – whether a Remain voter or a Leave voter – sits 
somewhere on a spectrum. 
Almost nobody who voted Remain believes that the EU is 
perfect.  Likewise, I have struggled to find a single Leave voter who 
seriously wanted to emulate North Korea in eschewing any kind of 
relations with other countries.  Nor are there many who wish the UK to 
leave the EU in order to follow the US regulatory framework (and all 
the political choices that come with that). 
Voting against something was the easy bit.  Perhaps that is why 




[2] Although the South East of England voted to leave the EU in 2016, 
it did so by a smaller margin than any other region of England and by 
less than England as a whole.  Given demographic changes since 
then it is plausible that it might vote ‘Remain’ if a second referendum 
were to be held today.  The same cannot be said of the Midlands or 
North East. 
[3] Imagine the not-implausible situation where the Lib Dems receive 
10% of the vote, the Green Party 7% and Change UK 8%.  The 3 pro-
Remain parties receive a total of 25% of all votes in the region but 
don’t win a seat.  The Brexit Party also receives 25% of all votes 
but do win a seat. 
[4] https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2019/05/10/when-a-tactical-vote-may-
not-work-the-complex-choice-facing-remainers-in-the-ep-elections/ 
[5] https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/may/13/why-i-
wont-be-advising-people-to-vote-tactically-in-the-european-elections 
